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Abstract
We compare the standard one-bid …rst price auction to a corresponding two–bid
…rst price auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high bid and a low one and
the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids. We characterize
the equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove some results on the ranking of
revenues and expected utilities across the two mechanisms for the symmetric case.
We show that subjects in a computerized experiment prefer the two–bid auction over
the one–bid auction when given the possibility of choosing among the two and we
claim that this and other aspects of subjects’ behavior conform to the equilibrium
predictions for risk–averse subjects. We also report some discrepancies between the
experimental results and the equilibrium predictions and provide some alternative
explanations to the observed behavior.
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1 Introduction
The dramatic increase in auction-trade volume over the last few years has been followed by
an impressive increase in the variety of auction mechanisms used by the sellers. Leading
listing auction-sites (Lucking-Reiley, 1999) on the Web like Ebay, Yahoo, City Auction,
etc. o¤er the possibility to sell/buy products through (di¤erent variations on) standard
English and Dutch auctions. Other auction sites employ a large variety of di¤erent auction
mechanisms like sealed-bid auctions, auctions where player pay …xed participation fees
and more. Indeed, it has been suggested (Monderer and Tennenholtz, 1998) that online
auctioneers compete for the pool of potential buyers by choosing the auction type that
would maximize their expected payo¤s, while taking into account that buyers would
choose the auction-site that maximizes their expected utilities.
This paper deals with a new type of auction that has recently appeared on the Web, a
…rst–price auction where buyers may submit several bids for the same object. One of
the largest auctions in Israel, “The State Auction,” for example, allows each bidder to
submit up to three di¤erent price proposals in each auction.1 The rules state that “if
more than one of your o¤ers has won, then the highest winning o¤ers would be canceled
and you would only pay your lower winning o¤er”. The same is true for “The Double
Auction”, another leading auction in Israel.2 Here, you may submit up to 5 o¤ers for the
same product but you pay a per-o¤er participation fee so that as the number of o¤ers you
submit increases, you pay more.
With these examples as a motivation, this paper compares the standard (iid-assumption3,
one indivisible object) …rst-price auction where each player may submit only one bid
1”The State Auction” is both, Web-based at http://www.e-hamichraz.co.il/ and published in a book-
let, that is distributed with leading newspapers. Bidders may thus place bids through the Web or by
calling a phone number.
2Again the auction is Web based at http://www.2bid.co.il but the catalogue also appears as a printed
booklet.
3Subjects’ private valuations are independent and identical (iid) draws from a uniform distribution
[a; b], where a and b are common knowledge.
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(henceforth: the one–bid auction) to a corresponding two–bid …rst-price auction (hence-
forth: the two–bid auction) where each player may submit two bids and the winner pays
his low bid if this is higher than the highest bid submitted by his opponents. We charac-
terize the (constant relative risk averse) equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove some
results on the ranking of revenues and expected utilities across the two mechanisms for the
symmetric case. Furthermore, we conduct an experiment where subjects play repeatedly
one–bid auctions and two–bid auctions with randomly chosen partners and compare the
experimental results with the equilibrium predictions.
One of the interesting features of our experiment is that, in the last phase of the exper-
iment, subjects are repeatedly asked to choose between the two auction mechanisms. In
particular, in the second phase of our experiment (after playing each auction type for
24 rounds in the …rst phase) subjects could choose (for 16 rounds) their favorite auction
mechanism before observing their realized value. This enabled us to directly examine
subjects’ preferences across the two mechanisms and check the consistency of subjects’
behavior with respect to the equilibrium benchmark.
Another non-standard feature of the experiment is that we allow subjects to submit bids
that are lower than the minimum possible private value. Indeed, we …nd that many
subjects bid less than the minimum value when given the opportunity.
The experimental literature on auction mechanisms in general and …rst–price private-
value auctions in particular is too large to survey in this short introduction.4 Therefore,
we will just mention some of the contributions. Cox et al.(1982, 1985, 1988, 1992) ran
a comprehensive set of experiments trying to explain and characterize subjects’ behavior
in di¤erent auctions. Among the factors that they investigated are, e.g., the impact of
the chosen price rule (see also Coppinger et al., 1980, Güth et al., 1999), the number
of bidders (see also Kagel and Levin, 1993), subjects’ motivation (see also Kagel and
Levin, 1985, Kagel and Roth, 1992), the selected incentive scheme (see also Harrison,
4For more details and references see the survey by Kagel (1995).
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1989). In an e¤ort to explain signi…cant heterogeneity in individual bidding patterns,
Cox et al. develop formal models where subjects have the constant relative coe¢cient of
risk aversion (CRRA) type of utility functions (henceforth referred to as CRRAM). Chen
and Plott (1998) investigate bidding behavior in auctions where the private valuations
are drawn from nonuniform distributions. Pezanis-Christou (1998) and Güth et al.(2001)
study di¤erent types of auctions with asymmetric bidders. However, all these studies focus
on the traditional one-bid type of auctions. This paper is (to the best of our knowledge)
the …rst study of multi-bid auctions where bidders may submit several bids for a given
object.
Our main results can be summarized as follows:
(1) Subjects behave as if they are risk–averse in the sense of bidding more than the risk
neutral equilibrium strategies in approximately 60% to 70% of the cases. Still, we
…nd a robust inclination to “bargain–bid”; i.e., to bid prices that are below the
lowest possible private value.
(2) The average prices collected by the seller and the average revenues to the buyers are
not signi…cantly di¤erent across the two mechanisms in the …rst phase of the exper-
iment. Still, subjects reveal a robust inclination to prefer the two–bid mechanism
over the one-bid mechanism in the second phase of the experiment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The theoretical results are presented
in Section 2. The experimental procedure is described in Section 3 and the experimental
results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 A model
Consider an independent private-value two-bidder auction where Vi » U [0; 1] for each
bidder i = 1; 2: Let vi 2 [0; 1] denote the realized value of bidder i: We compare the case
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of a one–bid auction where each bidder i may only submit one bid bi(vi) to the case of
a two-bid auction where each bidder i may submit two bids: A high–bid hi(vi) and a
low–bid li(vi) where li(vi) · hi(vi) for every vi 2 [0; 1]:
The rules of the one–bid auction are the standard rules for …rst–price sealed–bid auctions;
i.e., the highest bidder wins the auction and pays his bid. The rules of the two-bid auction
are as follows:
The bidder who has submitted the highest bid wins the auction. If both bidders have
submitted the same highest o¤er, the winner is randomly selected (with probability 0.5
for each bidder). If the winner’s low-bid was strictly higher than the high–bid of the other
bidder, then the winner pays his low-bid. Otherwise, the winner pays his high–bid.
As a benchmark for analyzing the experimental results that follow, we would like to
characterize and compare the equilibria of the one–bid auction and the two-bid auction.
First, we restrict the analysis to the case of bidders with symmetric preferences and
assume that the utility function of the representative bidder takes the constant relative
coe¢cient of risk aversion form U(x) = x® for some ® > 0 (see however Proposition 5 for
the asymmetric case). Note that ® < 1 describes a case where the agents are risk–averse,
® = 1 is the case for risk–neutral agents, and ® > 1 is the case for risk–seeking agents.
Proposition 1 gives the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies of the two games:
Proposition 1: The bidding strategy
b¤(v) =
1
1 + ®
¢ v (1)
is a symmetric equilibrium of the one–bid auction.5
The bidding strategies
l¤(v) = L(®) ¢ v and h¤(v) = H(®) ¢ v (2)
with
L(®) =
1 ¡ [ ®1+® ]®
1 + ®¡ [ ®1+® ]®
and H(®) =
1 + ® ¢ L(®)
1 + ®
; (3)
constitute a symmetric equilibrium of the two–bid auction.
5For notational convenience let v rather than vi denote the realized value of bidder i:
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The derivation of the equilibrium strategies can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 2: In equilibrium,
b¤(v) =
1
2
v; l¤(v) =
1
3
v and h¤(v) =
2
3
v (4)
when the bidders are risk-neutral;
b¤(v) >
1
2
v; l¤(v) >
1
3
v and h¤(v) >
2
3
v (5)
when the bidders are risk-averse;
b¤(v) <
1
2
v; l¤(v) <
1
3
v and h¤(v) <
2
3
v (6)
when the bidders are risk-seeking.
From Proposition 2 it immediately follows that the expected revenue for the seller is equal
across the two auction–types when ® = 1:6 Proposition 3 compares the expected revenues
for the seller from both auction types for other risk–preferences:
Proposition 3: In equilibrium, the expected revenue for the seller from the one–bid
auction is higher than the expected revenue from the two-bid auction when the
agents are risk–averse; the expected revenue for the seller from the two-bid auction
is higher than the expected revenue from the one–bid auction when the bidders are
risk-seeking.
The next proposition compares the expected utility of the bidder across the two mecha-
nisms for di¤erent ®–types.
Proposition 4: In equilibrium, for every v 2 [0; 1]; the expected utility of the bidder
with valuation v from the two-bid auction is higher than his expected utility from
the one–bid auction when the bidder is risk–averse; the expected utility from the
one–bid auction is higher than the expected utility from the two-bid auction when
the bidder is risk–seeking; the expected utilities are equal across the two mechanisms
when the bidder is risk–neutral.
6By standard arguments, this also follows from the Revenue–Equivalence Theorem.
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Our …nal proposition generalizes Proposition 1 and the inequalities of Proposition 2 by
claiming that the corresponding results apply to the asymmetric CRRAM (see Cox et al.,
1982) where the utility function of agent i takes the form Ui(xi) = x®ii and ®1 6= ®2:7
Proposition 5: Assume (w.l.g.) that ®1 ¸ ®2. The bidding strategy
b¤i (vi) =
1
1 + ®i
¢ vi; (7)
for vi · 1+®21+®1 ; characterizes an equilibrium of the one–bid auction.
The bidding strategies
l¤i (vi) = L(®i) ¢ vi and h¤i (vi) = H(®i) ¢ vi (8)
with
L(®i) =
1 ¡ [ ®i1+®i ]®i
1 + ®i ¡ [ ®i1+®i ]®i
and H(®i) =
1 + ®i ¢ L(®i)
1 + ®i
; (9)
for vi · H(®1)H(®2) ; characterize an equilibrium of the two–bid auction.
In equilibrium
b¤i (vi) =
1
2
vi; l¤(vi) =
1
3
vi and h(vi) =
2
3
vi (10)
when bidder i is risk-neutral;
b¤i (vi) >
1
2
vi; l¤(vi) >
1
3
vi and h(vi) >
2
3
vi (11)
when bidder i is risk-averse;
b¤i (vi) <
1
2
vi; l¤(vi) <
1
3
vi and h(vi) <
2
3
vi (12)
when bidder i is risk-seeking.
7Note, however, that Propositions 3 and 4 cannot be directly generalized to the case of asymmetric
bidders. In particular, note that in the asymmetric case, one bidder might be risk–averse while the
other is risk–seeking so that the revenue for the seller and the expected utility of the buyer depend more
complicatedly on the risk–preferences of both participants.
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The proof (with all other proofs) can be found in Appendix A.
Finally note that by standard arguments the corresponding equilibrium strategies for the
case where subjects’ valuations are drawn from the interval [a; b] are
b¤(v) = a+
1
1 + ®
¢ (v ¡ a) (13)
l¤(v) = a+ L(®) ¢ (v ¡ a) and h¤(v) = a+H(®) ¢ (v ¡ a) (14)
with L(®) and H(®) as de…ned in equations (3.3) above.
Observe also that since
L(®) · 1
1 + ®
· H(®) (15)
independent of ®;
l(v) · b(v) · h(v) (16)
for every v independent of the risk preferences of the agents.
In the proceeding analysis we use these equilibria and the propositions above as a bench-
marks for analyzing the experimental results.8
3 Experimental design
The experimental sessions were subdivided into two distinct phases. In the …rst phase the
subjects played repeatedly the two di¤erent auction types (one-bid and two-bid auctions)
for 48 consecutive rounds. First, they played 6 rounds of the one-bid auction; then 6
rounds of the two-bid auction. These twelve games formed the …rst block of the experi-
ment. It was followed by three other similar blocks where each auction type was played
for 6 consecutive rounds in the same order as in block 1. The number of participants in
each session was 8. In each round, the 8 subjects were randomly divided into four pairs.
In the second phase of the experiment, the participants played repeatedly for 16 rounds
an extended auction-selection game where bidders may choose their favorite auction type
8Note however that (because of the obvious technical constraints) in the experiment vi was drawn
from the …nite set V = f50; 51; 52; ; :::148; 149; 150g.
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before observing their realized private value. To guarantee that an even number of sub-
jects chooses each mechanism, we have only let 7 out of the 8 participants choose their
favorite auction type (one-bid or two-bid auction) in each round. The 8-th participant was
automatically assigned to one of the auction types accordingly. The identity of the ”8-th”
player was changed in each round, so that each subject played the balancing role twice
among the 16 rounds. After selecting the auction type for each pair, the corresponding
auction was played just as in the …rst phase of the experiment.
The private values of the bidders in each round were randomly drawn from the set
V = f50; 51; 52; ; :::148; 149; 150g with all values vi 2 V being equally likely. Subjects
could choose integer bids between 0 and 200:9 Thus bidders were allowed to underbid the
lowest possible private value vi = 50 as well as to overbid the highest possible private
value vi = 150. All values were denoted in a …ctitious currency termed ECU for Exper-
imental Currency Unit. Actual payments were determined according to the rules of the
corresponding auction (see the Instructions in Appendix C). At the end of each round,
the bidders observed a feedback–window specifying whether they have won the current
auction or not, the …nal buying price, the bids of both participants, their own pro…t in
the current round, their total pro…ts up to the current round and their average pro…t in
each auction type.
All experimental sessions were computerized.10 Most participants were students of eco-
nomics or business administration at Humboldt University, Berlin. In total, an experi-
mental session lasted about two hours. The conversion rate of the ECU earned by each
subject into cash was: 1 ECU = 0.03 DM. In addition, subjects were paid a …xed par-
ticipation fee of 10 DM. Subjects’ total earnings ranged between 18.00 DM to 44.41 DM
with a mean of 32.44 DM. Altogether, we ran 6 sessions resulting in 1152 (576 one-bid,
576 two-bid) auctions in the …rst phase and 384 (101 one-bid, 283 two-bid) auctions in
the second phase.
9When comparing the experimental results to the equilibrium benchmarks we sometimes normalize
the realized private values and the bids submitted in the experiment by subtracting 50 and dividing the
di¤erence by 100.
10The software for the computerized experiment was developed with the help of z-Tree (Fischbacher,
1998).
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4 Results
4.1 Bidding behavior
4.1.1 Overbidding realized values
Bidding above one’s private valuation always de…nes a weakly dominated strategy. In
our sample, only 10 of the 1354 bids submitted in the one–bid auction were above value.
Moreover, 9 of these 10 bids were submitted in the …rst block and are presumably due to
initial problems in understanding the game rules (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B).
Overbidding was much more frequent in the two-bid auctions. The overbidding rate for
these auctions was 3:84% (66 bids out of the 1718 high–bids submitted in these auctions).
The overbidding rate was 4:8% for the …rst phase of the experiment and 1:9% for the
second phase of the experiment.11 In only 3 cases did bidders submit a low–bid higher
than their valuation; all these cases occurred in the …rst block of the experiment. A
possible explanation for the high overbidding ratios observed in the two–bid auctions
is a bidder’s illusion that by submitting a large high–bid, he increases his chances of
winning without increasing the buying price; i.e., he increases the chances of submitting
the highest bid but eventually pay his low o¤er. The data indeed shows that in 40% of
all overbidding cases in the …rst phase of the experiment, the overbidders ended up with
positive payo¤s.12
4.1.2 Bargain–bidding
Recall that the minimal possible valuation for the buyer in our auctions was 50. It
immediately follows that in equilibrium bidders should never bid less than 50.13 The
experimental data set, however, shows that 7:7% of the bids submitted in one–bid auc-
tions; 16:9% of the low–bids submitted in two–bid auctions and 5:8% of the high–bids
11The di¤erences in overbidding ratios across the four blocks in the …rst phase were not statistically
signi…cant.
12Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) conjecture that in a second-price sealed-bid auction subjects also
succumb to the illusion that bidding above their values increases their chances of winning without in-
creasing the buying price; i.e., the bid of the other bidder.
13Bids equal to 50 might be submitted in equilibrium when the realized valuation of the buyer is 50.
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submitted in two-bid auctions were lower than 50. We henceforth refer to these cases as
“bargain–bidding”. Table 3.1 gives the proportion of bargain–bidding, the average bid
submitted by bargain–bidders and the corresponding average values of bargain–bidders
for each type of bid.
one-bid two-bid_high two-bid_low
phase 1 phase 2 phase 1 phase 2 phase 1 phase 2
prop. bargain-bid 7.7% 7.4% 6.2% 4.9% 16.9% 16.8%
mean bargain-bid 33 38 30 35 31 35
value 63 58 60 58 66 66
Table 3.1: Proportion of bargain-bidding, average bargain-bid,
corresponding average value
The relatively high rates of extremely low bidding seems like an interesting feature of
our experimental data set. A possible explanation could be the bidders’ attempts to
win the auction at special bargain–prices. Indeed the speci…c auctions mentioned in
the introduction (and many other auction sites on the Web) frequently close with prices
that are signi…cantly lower than the perceived fair-market price for similar items. The
possibility of buying the merchandise in a special bargain price seems to be one of the
factors that drive potential buyers to these auctions.
Note that underbidding may be rationalized by claiming that bargain–bidders expect
other bidders to go for such bargain–prices as well. Our data, however, shows that only
0:7% of the …rst–phase one–bid auctions (and 1:4% of the …rst–phase two–bid auctions)
closed at prices lower than 50. Still, 7:4% of the one–bids, 16:8% of the low-bids and
4:9% of the high-bids submitted in the second phase of the experiment were lower than 50
(see Table 3.1). The proportions of lower–than–50 bids in the second phase of the exper-
iment were not signi…cantly di¤erent14 than the corresponding rates for the …rst phase.
The inclination to bid lower than 50 thus seems robust with respect to the unsuccessful
experience it produced at the …rst phase of the experiment.
14For each session.
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4.1.3 Bidding relatively to RNE benchmark
The formal results in Section 2 imply the following equilibrium benchmarks for risk–
neutral agents (henceforth referred to as the RNE strategies):
b¤(v) = 50 +
1
2
¢ (v ¡ 50) (17)
l¤(v) = 50 +
1
3
¢ (v ¡ 50) and h¤(v) = 50 + 2
3
¢ (v ¡ 50): (18)
We employed a Wilcoxon test to check the null hypothesis that the observed bids are
not signi…cantly di¤erent from the equilibrium–benchmarks for risk-neutral agents, i.e.,
b(v) ¡ b¤(v) = 0, h(v) ¡ h¤(v) = 0 and l(v) ¡ l¤(v) = 0, respectively. We ran the test for
each subject and each type of bid separately. Following the benchmarks of Proposition
2, we say that the subject bids as if (s)he is risk-averse when the Wilcoxon statistic
is positive. We similarly say that the subject bids as if (s)he is risk-seeking when the
statistic is negative. Table 3.2 gives the number of subjects classi…ed as risk-averse and
risk-seeking for each type of bid. The numbers in brackets state the number of subjects
for which the statistic is signi…cant at p · 0:05 (two-tailed).
Total one-bid two-bid_high two-bid_low
Session Nr. of risk- risk- risk- risk- risk- risk-
Subjects averse seeking averse seeking averse seeking
1 8 5 (3) 3 (2) 5 (4) 3 (1) 4 (2) 4 (1)
2 8 6 (4) 2 (0) 6 (6) 2 (2) 6 (5) 2 (2)
3 8 6 (4) 2 (1) 5 (4) 3 (1) 6 (4) 2 (2)
4 8 8 (8) 0 (-) 8 (7) 0 (-) 8 (4) 0 (-)
5 8 6 (6) 2 (2) 7 (5) 1 (1) 7 (5) 1 (0)
6 8 7 (4) 1 (1) 5 (4) 3 (2) 5 (4) 3 (2)
all 48 38 (29) 10 (6) 36 (30) 12 (7) 36 (24) 12 (7)
Table 3.2: Subjects classi…ed by results of Wilcoxon test
Note that overall (across all sessions) the proportion of risk-averse behavior was not
lower than 75% while the proportion of risk-seeking behavior was close to 25%: These
proportions seem reminiscent of those observed in Cox et al.(1988) and other experimental
studies of …rst-price auctions and support the general belief that subjects act risk-averse
rather than risk-seeking in …rst-price auctions (see Kagel, 1995).15
15These proportions are also close to those observed in many “other” past experiments on choice and
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4.1.4 Bidding ratios
De…ne the (revealed) bidding ratio of an agent with a realized valuation v in a one-bid
auction as follows 16
rb(v) =
b(v) ¡ 50
v ¡ 50 (19)
Similarly, de…ne the (revealed) bidding ratios of the agent in a two-bid auction as
rl(v) =
l(v) ¡ 50
v ¡ 50 and rh(v) =
h(v) ¡ 50
v ¡ 50 (20)
Recall (see the last paragraph of Section 2) that in equilibrium rl(v) < rb(v) < rh(v);
for each value v; independent of the risk preferences of the subjects. In particular, for
risk-neutral agents, rl(v) = 1=3 < rb(v) = 1=2 < rh(v) = 2=3: Indeed, when we average
the three bidding ratios for each subject we …nd that 79:3% of the subjects conform with
the prediction rl(v) < rb(v), while 83:7% conform with the conjectured rb(v) < rh(v):17
Table 3.3 gives the median bidding ratios for each session and each auction type. The
median ratios are higher than the benchmark RNE ratios, which again suggests risk–averse
behavior (in the sense of Proposition 2) in our sample.18
median bidding ratio
rb (v) rh(v) rl(v)
Session phase 1 phase 2 phase 1 phase 2 phase 1 phase 2
1 .56 .62 .74 .71 .39 .19
2 .60 .66 .77 .78 .41 .47
3 .59 .47 .77 .85 .43 .46
4 .70 .81 .86 .88 .44 .46
5 .61 .68 .79 .83 .45 .50
6 .58 .55 .77 .70 .46 .41
all .61 .63 .79 .80 .44 .44
Table 3.3: Median bidding ratios
decision. Tversky and Kahneman (1986), to cite a classic reference, report that 72% of 126 subjects
preferred a certain payo¤ of 100 over a 50% chance of obtaining a payo¤ of 200. In a recent investigation,
Sonsino et al.(2001) …nd that 69% of 120 subjects prefer a certain payo¤ of 107 on a lottery that pays
150 with probability 30%; 80 with probability 40% and 100 with probability 30%.
16For simpli…cation we suppress the agent-index i from the notation for r.
17The conformity rates for the …rst phase of the experiment were 72:9% and 83:3%; respectively; the
corresponding rates for the second phase were 86:4%; and 84:1%; respectively. A Wilcoxon test, N = 6,
two–tailed, suggests that the di¤erences in proportions across the two phases are statistically insigni…cant
at p > 0:1:
18The average bidding ratios are much lower than the median ratios because of the underbidding
discussed above in this section.
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4.1.5 Correlation between bids and values
The coe¢cients of correlation between the three individual bidding ratios (rb; rl; rh) and
the corresponding realized values were found to be positive and statistically signi…cant at
0.01 for both phases of the experiment. Moreover, the coe¢cients for the second phase
are signi…cantly higher than those for the …rst phase.19 In particular, the Spearman
correlation coe¢cients for the bidding ratio in the one–bid auctions (rb) were 0.174 (for
the …rst phase of the experiment) and 0.299 (for the second phase). The corresponding
coe¢cients for the high–bidding ratio (rh) were 0.143 and 0.217 and for the low bidding
ratio (rl): 0.365 and 0.410, respectively. Note that in our benchmark equilibrium model
the bidding ratios are constant; this implies zero correlation between bidding ratios and
values, a prediction that is violated by the data. The observed positive correlations suggest
that subjects tend to bid more aggressively as their realized value increases. Moreover,
this inclination increases in the second phase of the experiment.
The correlation between bids and values becomes even more signi…cant when we examine
the three Relative Bidding Deviations (see Kagel and Roth, 1992):
RBDb =
b(v) ¡ b¤(v)
v
(21)
RBDh =
h(v) ¡ h¤(v)
v
and RBDl =
l(v) ¡ l¤(v)
v
: (22)
The coe¢cients described in Table 3.4 are positive and statistically signi…cant: Recall that
in Kagel and Roth (1992) the coe¢cients were negative and used to support Harrison’s
(1989) “‡at maximum critique”20 concerning the experimental evidence with …rst–price
auctions.21 The positive coe¢cients found in the current study may thus be used as
counter–evidence to the ‡at maximum critique and (in this sense) seem to strengthen the
weight of our evidence for risk–averse behavior in …rst–price auctions.
19Wilcoxon one-tailed test, p < :05 for rb and rh, N = 6. For rl; the correlation coe¢cient in phase 2
is higher than in phase 1 in 4 (out of 6) sessions.
20Harrison’s critique suggests that subjects who have low realized values and thus have low odds of
winning the auction have little incentives to bid optimally. See chapter G in Kagel’s survey on auctions
in the Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995) for more details on this controversy.
21Negative correlations between subjects’ valuations and the relative bidding ratios were also found by
Pezanis-Christou (1998) in his study of asymmetric auctions.
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one-bid two-bid_high two-bid_low
Session phase 1 phase 2 phase 1 phase 2 phase 1 phase 2
1 .319** .618** .402** .470** .661** .661**
(192) (46) (192) (82) (192) (82)
2 .275** .522** .328** .466** .544** .536**
(192) (28) (192) (100) (192) (100)
3 .296** .395** .187** .321** .335** .239*
(192) (44) (192) (84) (192) (84)
4 .456** .851** .301** .423** .376** .406**
(192) (42) (192) (86) (192) (86)
5 .172* .194 .281** .601** .313** .644**
(192) (32) (192) (96) (192) (96)
6 .428** .830** .370** .394** .539** .641**
(192) (10) (192) (118) (192) (118)
all .312** .477** .302** .427** .462** .521**
(1152) (202) (1152) (566) (1152) (566)
** signi…cant at .01 level (two-tailed); * signi…cant at .05 level (two-tailed)
Table 3.4: Spearman correlation coe¢cients: RBDs and values
(number of RBDs in brackets)
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Figure 3.1: Time paths of median bidding ratios (phase 1)
4.1.6 Dynamics
Figure 3.1 describes the changes in median bidding ratios in the 48 rounds of the …rst phase
of the experiment. The rather ‡at lines suggest that subjects’ behavior does not change
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in any speci…c direction across these rounds. Furthermore, the results of a Spearman
correlation analysis between the relative bidding deviations (RBDs) at each round t and
the corresponding round index t disclose no clear-cut trends; the correlation coe¢cients
are both, positive and negative, and in almost all cases insigni…cant. Overall it seems
that our subjects did not signi…cantly modify their behavior during the experiment.
It is still interesting, however, to check whether the information–feedback provided to
the subjects at the end of each round generated some consistencies in subjects’ behavior.
Table 3.5 presents the proportion of cases where subjects’ behavior matched the following
two heuristics:
Heuristic 1: “Increase your bidding ratio after losing the current auction”
Heuristic 2: “Decrease your bidding ratio after winning the current auction,”
in each phase of the experiment.22
one-bid two-bid_high two-bid_low
phase 1 phase 2 phase 1 phase 2 phase 1 phase 2
Heuristic 1 63% 75% 57% 60% 59% 57%
Heuristic 2 62% 65% 57% 58% 58% 56%
Table 3.5: Proportion of cases where subjects followed each heuristic
Table 3.5 shows that the proportion of cases where subjects conformed to heuristic 1 when
playing one-bid auctions was 63% in the …rst phase of the experiment. The proportion for
the second phase of the experiment was much higher, 75%; but recall that the sample size
for this case was relatively low (only 101 one–bid auctions). The corresponding conformity
rates for heuristic 2 were above 60% in both phases of the experiment. The conformity
rates for the bids submitted in two–bid auctions were slightly lower; however still close to
60% and always higher than 50% in all sessions but one. The proportions for the second
phase of the experiment were not signi…cantly di¤erent from those obtained for the …rst
phase of the experiment.23
22The motivation for studying such heuristics may also follow from the learning direction theory applied
to the context of auctions (see Selten and Buchta, 1998, and Güth, 1998).
23Wilcoxon test, p > :625 , N = 6, two–tailed.
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4.1.7 Estimation
This section brie‡y describes the results of an estimation of the equilibrium benchmark
models presented in Section 2.
To decide on the appropriate level of estimation (a separate estimation for each subject vs.
an aggregate estimation over all subjects) we use the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallace H
test for heterogeneity across samples. Formally, for each session and for each type of bid
using the data from the …rst phase of the experiment, we separately test the null hypothesis
that the eight (number of subjects per session) vectors of observed deviations from the
risk neutral equilibrium predictions represent eight samples from the same population.24
The null hypothesis is strongly rejected (p < 0:001) for all 6 sessions and for all 3 types
of bids (one–bid, low–bid and high–bid).
Given this result we prefer to estimate an asymmetric model that acknowledges the het-
erogeneity across subjects. However, direct estimation of the CRRAM equations (see
Proposition 5) for each subject seems to require exceptional technical e¤ort.25 We, there-
fore, choose to estimate a system of three linear bid functions using the seemingly unre-
lated regressions estimation technique (SURE).26 Given the fact that the same individual
submitted three di¤erent types of bids, the disturbances in the three equations (at a
given time) are likely to re‡ect some common unmeasurable factors, and hence could be
correlated.
In particular, we estimate the following system of three linear equations on the normalized
data for each subject i:
bi = ¯b0i + ¯
b
1i ¢ vone¡bidi + ²bi (23)
hi = ¯h0i + ¯
h
1i ¢ vtwo¡bidi + ²hi (24)
24The vector’s dimension is 192; the number of auctions of each type in the …rst phase of the experiment
is 24.
25See, for example, the heavy computation required to estimate the CRRAM model for standard one–
bid auctions in Chen and Plott (1998).
26For a formal presentation of the SURE model see, e.g., Judge et al.(1988), pp. 443-466.
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li = ¯l0i + ¯
l
1i ¢ vtwo¡bidi + ²li (25)
where ²bi ; ²li and ²hi represent the noise in each equation and the variance–covariance matrix
of the three noise-variables may take an arbitrary (non-diagonal) form.27
Figure B.3 in Appendix B describes the distribution of the R2 of the estimated equations.
The …t of the linear approximations is quite good. The median value of R2 is 0.899. Only
for about 8% of the subjects do the explanatory variables (vi) explain less than 70% of
the variation in all three bids. For about 70% of the subjects, however, the explanatory
variables explain over 81% of the bids variation.
Nr. of number of ^¯
j
0i sign. 6= 0 number of ^¯j0i < 0
Session subjects ^¯
b
0i
^¯h
0i
^¯l
0i
^¯b
0i
^¯h
0i
^¯l
0i
1 8 5 (63%) 5 (63%) 8 (100%) 7 (88%) 7 (88%) 8 (100%)
2 8 3 (38%) 1 (13%) 6 (75%) 4 (50%) 6 (75%) 7 (88%)
3 8 3 (38%) 2 (25%) 4 (50%) 7 (88%) 4 (50%) 7 (88%)
4 8 1 (13%) 3 (38%) 3 (38%) 6 (75%) 3 (38%) 6 (75%)
5 8 1 (13%) 0 (0%) 2 (25%) 3 (38%) 4 (50%) 5 (63%)
6 8 3 (38%) 5 (63%) 5 (63%) 7 (88%) 5 (63%) 8 (100%)
all 48 16 (33%) 16 (33%) 28 (58%) 34 (71%) 29 (60%) 41 (85%)
Nr. of number of signi…cant number of
Session subjects ^¯
b
1i 6= 12 ^¯
h
1i 6= 23 ^¯
l
1i 6= 13 ^¯
b
1i >
1
2
^¯h
1i >
2
3
^¯l
1i >
1
3
1 8 5 (63%) 7 (88%) 8 (100%) 8 (100%) 7 (88%) 8 (100%)
2 8 4 (50%) 7 (88%) 7 (88%) 6 (75%) 6 (75%) 7 (88%)
3 8 5 (63%) 5 (63%) 6 (75%) 7 (88%) 7 (88%) 8 (100%)
4 8 7 (88%) 6 (75%) 7 (88%) 8 (100%) 7 (88%) 8 (100%)
5 8 6 (75%) 4 (50%) 6 (75%) 7 (88%) 5 (63%) 7 (88%)
6 8 7 (88%) 5 (63%) 8 (100%) 8 (100%) 6 (75%) 8 (100%)
all 48 34 (71%) 34 (71%) 42 (88%) 44 (92%) 38 (79%) 46 (96%)
Table 3.6: Summary of regression estimates (^¯
j
0i; ^¯
j
1i)
27To test the underlying assumption that the variance–covariance matrix of the noise terms is indeed
non-diagonal we use the Lagrange multiplier statistic, suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1980). For the
current application, the statistic is ¸ = T (r212 + r213 + r223) where r2ij (=
¾^2ij
¾^ii¾^jj
) is the squared correlation
and T is the number of auctions. Under H0: ¾12 = ¾13 = ¾23 = 0, ¸ has an asymptotic Â2-distribution
with 3 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected if ¸ > 7:81473 (the critical value
from a Â2(3)-distribution at 5% signi…cance level). This condition is satis…ed for 65% (31 out of 48) of the
subjects.
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Table 3.6 summarizes the estimation results. For 7 of the 48 subjects (15%) all three
estimated intercepts, ^¯
b
0i, ^¯
l
0i, ^¯
h
0i, are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The intercepts
for the one-bid auctions [i.e., the intercepts for equation (3.24)] are negative in 71%
of the cases.28 The corresponding proportions of negative intercepts for the high–bid
equation (3.24) and low–bid equation (3.25) are 60% and 85%, respectively. A possible
explanation for the negative intercepts might be found in the observed phenomena of
”bargain-bidding” discussed earlier in this section.
The estimation results for the slopes recon…rm our previous …ndings on subjects’ incli-
nation for risk-averse behavior. For almost half of the subjects (22 out of 48 subjects)
all three slopes ^¯
b
1i; ^¯
l
1i and ^¯
h
1i were signi…cantly higher than the corresponding equilib-
rium benchmarks for risk–neutral agents. Moreover, in the one-bid auctions 71% of the
estimated slopes were signi…cantly higher than the risk-neutral level. The correspond-
ing proportions for the two–bid auctions were 69% (for the high-bids) and 88% (for the
low-bids).
4.2 E¢ciency
We say that an auction allocation is e¢cient if the bidder with the highest value wins the
auction. Overall, the proportions of ine¢cient one-bid auctions (15:3% for phase 1 and
16:8% for phase 2) are considerably higher than the corresponding proportions (10:2%;
12:0%, respectively) for the two-bid auctions.
To further analyze the e¢ciency of each auction type we de…ne the E¢ciency Ratio (ER)
ER =
vbuyer
max fv1; v2g (26)
where vbuyer denotes the valuation of the winner.
Note that the e¢ciency ratio equals 1 when the auction is won by the bidder with the
highest valuation; however, the ratio is lower than one when the auction is ine¢cient
28For comparison, note that Cox et al.(1988) …nd signi…cant intercepts for 34 of 156 subjects (21:8%)
and negative intercepts for 62:8% of the subjects in the standard …rst-price auction.
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and it is monotonically decreasing with the gap between the highest valuation and the
valuation of the buyer. Table 3.7 gives the average e¢ciency ratios for each auction.
Session phase 1 phase 2
one-bid two-bid one-bid two-bid
1 97.5 98.1 98.6 98.3
2 97.8 98.7 99.2 98.9
3 97.7 98.6 96.7 99.0
4 98.8 98.6 99.4 99.5
5 97.4 98.8 96.9 99.4
6 98.2 98.8 99.5 98.1
all 97.9 98.6 98.2 98.8
Table 3.7: Mean e¢ciency ratios, ER; (in %)
Again, the observed e¢ciency is (slightly) higher in the two-bid auction compared to
one-bid auction in both phases of the experiment. A Wilcoxon test suggests that the
di¤erence is statistically signi…cant in the …rst phase (p = 0:031;N = 6; one–tailed).
E¢ciency increases slightly for both auction types in the second phase. The di¤erence in
favor of the two-bid auction, however, is no longer signi…cant.
4.3 Prices and payo¤s
The average prices collected by the seller in each auction are presented in Table 3.8. The
average prices obtained in the …rst phase of the experiment are quite similar across the two
mechanisms. In the second phase, the one–bid auction seems to produce slightly higher
prices but the di¤erences are statistically insigni…cant (Wilcoxon test, p = :219 (:156); for
the …rst (second) phase, N = 6; two–tailed). Additional tests con…rm that there are no
signi…cant di¤erences between the cumulative distributions of prices (see Figure B.2 in
Appendix B) and the average prices obtained in each block of the experiment, across the
two auction types.
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Session 1. phase 2. phase
one-bid two-bid one-bid two-bid
1 91.22 (18.54) 86.70 (21.79) 91.09 (21.52) 81.32 (23.15)
2 89.83 (17.26) 89.03 (22.61) 101.71 (17.59) 89.20 (25.51)
3 90.47 (21.40) 94.29 (20.47) 89.36 (15.91) 91.48 (17.16)
4 96.50 (19.05) 94.01 (22.58) 104.14 (24.58) 94.05 (18.85)
5 92.43 (18.34) 91.14 (18.40) 95.50 (14.05) 88.04 (18.46)
6 96.43 (19.80) 87.57 (18.66) 86.60 (18.00) 90.07 (19.96)
all 92.81 (19.26) 90.46 (20.99) 95.38 (20.13) 89.12 (21.00)
Table 3.8: Mean prices (std. deviation)
The average payo¤s of the winning bidder in each auction type in the …rst phase of the
experiment are displayed in Table 3.9. Again, the results reveal no signi…cant di¤erences
across the two mechanisms (Wilcoxon test, p = :156, N = 6; two–tailed). Note, however,
that the standard deviation is signi…cantly higher in the two-bid auction (Binomial test,
p = :031, N = 6; two-tailed). Overall the results suggest that (on average) the experience
gained with the two mechanisms during the …rst phase of the experiment did not provide a
strong reason to prefer one of the two auction types in the second phase of the experiment.
The similarity in average payo¤s is maintained in the second phase of the experiment.29
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 all
one-bid 12.37 12.33 11.43 9.30 10.57 11.52 11.25
(16.39) (15.86) (16.86) (12.59) (15.73) (16.60) (15.74)
two-bid 13.31 11.83 12.70 9.22 13.63 13.82 12.42
(17.83) (18.12) (18.74) (17.22) (19.34) (18.16) (18.27)
Table 3.9: Average payo¤s in phase 1 (std. deviation)
4.4 Choice of mechanism
Recall that in the second phase of the experiment subjects could choose their favorite
auction type before observing their realized value. Table 3.10 gives the distribution of
choices for each session. Altogether, subjects preferred the two-bid auction in 516 out of
672 cases (77%): Moreover, subjects’ strong preference for the two-bid auction holds in
all 6 sessions.
29Wilcoxon test, p = :219, N = 6, two–tailed.
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Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 all
one-bid 33% 21% 31% 28% 21% 6% 23%
two-bid 67% 79% 69% 72% 79% 94% 77%
Table 3.10: Auction selection proportions (phase 2)
This strong result is con…rmed by the data at the individual level. Recall that each subject
was allowed to choose his favorite auction type in 14 rounds (and acted as the balancing
player at the other 2 rounds). Figure 3.2 demonstrates that an overwhelming majority
(77%) of the participants chose the two-bid auction at least 9 times.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
number of choices
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
su
b
je
ct
s
one-bid two-bid
Figure 3.2: Distribution of subjects’ choices
A closer inspection of the data suggests that 15 of our 48 subjects (31%) chose the two–
bid auction in more than 7 of their 14 choice–rounds, in spite of the fact that their
average pro…ts in the two-bid auction was lower or approximately equal30 to the average
pro…ts in the one-bid auction in the …rst phase of the experiment. The 24 subjects that
had a pro…table experience with the two–bid mechanism during the …rst phase of the
experiment, chose, on average, the two-bid auction in 12 of the 14 rounds.
Furthermore, when we count the number of cases (in the second phase of the experiment)
where: (i) a subject that lost a two-bid auction chose the same auction type in the
following round or (ii) a subject that won a one–bid auction chose the two–bid auction in
30We say that the pro…ts were approximately equal when the di¤erence in average payo¤s was not
bigger than 1.
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the following round, we …nd that in 197 out of 246 cases (80%) subjects who had plausible
reasons to select the one-bid auction voted for the two-bid auction.
One possible explanation for this result is provided by our benchmark equilibrium model.
The model suggests that when subjects act risk–aversively: (1) their bidding ratios would
be higher than the ones corresponding to the RNE and (2) their expected utility from the
two–bid auction would be higher than the corresponding utility from the one–bid auction
(for each value v). Our data would seem to …t these predictions in both dimensions.
Alternatively, one might invoke a context–dependent preferences type of argument to
explain the results. In particular, one might suggest that the two-bid mechanism is
perceived as more exciting than the standard one-bid auction. A variation on Conlisk’s
(1993) idea, for instance, would suggest that subjects that exhibit an “extra tiny utility”
from the possibility to place two di¤erent bids might prefer the two-bid mechanism over
the standard one-bid auction, as demonstrated in our data–set.
Finally one might suggest that the two-bid auction is perceived as easier to solve than the
one-bid auction. In particular, note that in the standard one-bid case, a submitted bid
not only determines the probability of winning but also represents at the same time the
price the bidder is willing to pay for the object. In the two-bid case the bidders have two
separate decision parameters. The probability of winning is determined by the high-bid
alone. The actual price paid by the bidder upon winning, however, might also depend
on the low-bid. This suggests that bidders might …nd the two-bid auction a cognitively
easier problem to solve and thus reveal strong preferences for this mechanism.
5 Concluding discussion
The constant increase in economic activity through the Web provides a serious challenge
to basic economic research. Economic transactions on the Web might be quite di¤erent in
many respects from the corresponding transactions in traditional environments. The costs
of conducting an auction on the Web, for instance, seem marginal compared to the costs
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of running the auction in a real auction house. Indeed, some of the largest auction-sites
on the Web (e.g., Ebay, Yahoo, City auction) act as listing–sites (Lucking–Reiley, 1999)
through which potential sellers may auction their merchandise with relatively low cost and
e¤ort. Note also that it is quite inexpensive to modify a given auction mechanism when
the auction is mounted on the Web. A shift from using a one–bid auction to implementing
a two–bid auction, for instance, seems like a technically trivial problem that should not
impose any signi…cant costs on the auctioneer. These conveniences of running auctions
on the Web, together with the “global market” e¤ect and the intensi…ed competition on
the electronic medium bring up the conjecture that sellers might compete at the level of
the auction mechanism; i.e., try to …nd the mechanism that attracts the most bidders and
generates the highest revenue for the seller. Indeed, Monderer and Tennenholtz (1998)
study an auction–selection game where multiple sellers of an homogeneous good compete
for a given pool of buyers. Sellers may choose di¤erent auction mechanisms (…rst–price,
second–price and in general k–th price auction); buyers choose their favorite auction-
sites accordingly. Monderer and Tennenholtz investigate the equilibria of the underlying
games and show that the optimal auction mechanism depends on the risk preferences of
the potential bidders.
With this as a general motivation for comparative studies of di¤erent auction mechanisms
on the Web, this paper focuses on a comparative experimental investigation of the one–bid
and two-bid …rst–price auctions. We show that (in both auction types) subjects typically
act as if they are risk-averse, in the sense of bidding more than the Nash equilibria for risk–
neutral agents and in the sense of preferring the two-bid auction over the one–bid auction
when given the possibility to select among the two. The average pro…ts to the buyer and
the average prices collected by the seller, however, were not signi…cantly di¤erent across
the two–mechanisms.
A closer inspection of the data shows that the individual bidding ratios (and the individual
relative deviations from the risk neutral equilibrium bidding strategies) tend to increase
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with the buyers’ realized values. In this sense, buyers tend to bid more aggressively
as their realized values increases. Subjects also reveal a robust inclination to bid less
than the minimal possible valuation; a phenomenon that we term “bargain–bidding”. An
inspection of the dynamics of play suggests that subjects do not modify their behavior
signi…cantly during the experiment. However, we …nd some inclination to follow intuitively
appealing behavioral heuristics; i.e., increase the bidding ratio after losing an auction and
decrease it after winning an auction.
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Appendix A:
Proof of propositions
First we derive the equilibrium strategies presented in Proposition 1.
We start with the two–bid model.
Assume a symmetric equilibrium h(¢); l(¢) where both bidding functions are strictly in-
creasing and continuous. Let h¡1(¢) and l¡1(¢) denote the corresponding inverse functions.
Let v denote the realized value of bidder i:
Let y ´ l(v) and z ´ h(v) denote the corresponding equilibrium bids.
Note that the probability that i’s lowest bid would win is equal to
Prob[h(vj) < y] = Prob[Vj < h¡1(y)] = h¡1(y)
Similarly, the probability that i’s high–bid would be highest is equal to
Prob[y · hj(vj) · z] =
Prob[h¡1(y)] · Vj · h¡1(z)] = h¡1(z) ¡ h¡1(y)
Assuming the utility function u(x) = x®; the expected utility of player i equals
(1) h¡1(y) ¢ [v ¡ y]® + [h¡1(z) ¡ h¡1(y)] ¢ [v ¡ z]®
Di¤erentiating (1) with respect to y gives the …rst order condition:
(2) ¡ ®[v ¡ y]®¡1 ¢ h¡1(y) + [v ¡ y]® ¢ d
d(y)
h¡1(y)
¡[v ¡ z]® ¢ d
d(y)
h¡1(y) = 0
Di¤erentiating (1) with respect to z gives the …rst order condition:
¡®[v ¡ z]®¡1 ¢ [h¡1(z) ¡ h¡1(y)] + [v ¡ z]® ¢ d
d(z)
h¡1(z) = 0
29
That is,
(3) ¡ ® ¢ [h¡1(z) ¡ h¡1(y)] + [v ¡ z] ¢ d
d(z)
h¡1(z) = 0
Note, however, that
(4)
d
d(y)
h¡1(y) =
1
h0(y)
(5)
d
d(z)
h¡1(z) =
1
h0(z)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (2) and (3) yields:
(6) ¡ ®[v ¡ y]®¡1 ¢ h¡1(y) + [v ¡ y]® ¢ 1
h0(y)
¡ [v ¡ z]® ¢ 1
h0(y)
= 0
(7) ¡ ® ¢ [h¡1(z) ¡ h¡1(y)] + [v ¡ z] ¢ 1
h0(z)
= 0
Trying
(8) y = L(®) ¢ v and z = H(®) ¢ v
in (6) and (7) gives
L(®) =
1 ¡ [ ®1+® ]®
1 + ®¡ [ ®1+® ]®
and H(®) =
1 + ®L
1 + ®
:
Direct calculations show that the Hessian matrix of the objective (1) is negative semi
de…nite so that
(9) l(v) = L(®) ¢ v and h(v) = H(®) ¢ v
is a symmetric equilibrium of the two-bid auction.
Consider next the one-bid …rst-price auction where the bidders’ utility function is given
by u(x) = x®:We derive the symmetric equilibrium of the model using b(¢) to denote the
equilibrium bidding strategy.31
31Vickrey (1961) solves the …rst-price auction model for the case where the bidders are risk-neutral; Holt
(1980), Riley and Samuelson (1981) assume identically risk-averse bidders. Cox et al.(1982) characterize
the equilibria of the asymmetric model when the agents may have di¤erent ®’s (CRRAM). For the
completeness of the exposition, however, we outline the derivation of the symmetric equilibrium.
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Note that the expected utility of a bidder with realized value v from bidding s ´ b(v) is
(10) b¡1(s) ¢ [v ¡ s]®:
Di¤erentiating with respect to s gives:
d
d(s)
b¡1(s) ¢ [v ¡ s]® ¡ ®[v ¡ s]®¡1 ¢ b¡1(s) = 0
This implies that
d
d(s)
b¡1(s) ¢ [v ¡ s] = ® ¢ b¡1(s)
Trying s = B(®) ¢ v gives B(®) = 11+® :
Checking the second order conditions con…rms that
(11) b(v) =
1
1 + ®
¢ v
is an equilibrium of the one-bid auction which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
To prove proposition 2 note that, by Bernoulli’s inequality,
[
®
1 + ®
]® = [1 ¡ 1
1 + ®
]® · 1 ¡ ®
1 + ®
=
1
1 + ®
· 2 ¡ ®
2
when ® · 1 and the inequalities are reversed when ® ¸ 1:
From the solution for l(v) above it follows that l(v) ¸ v=3 i¤ [ ®1+® ]® · [2¡®2 ] i¤ ® · 1
and the inequalities are reversed when ® ¸ 1:
It immediately follows that l(v) = v=3 [and h(v) = 2v=3] when the bidder is risk-neutral
(i.e., when ® = 1); l(v) > v=3 [and h(v) > 2v=3] when the bidder is risk-averse (i.e., when
® < 1) and l(v) < v=3 [and h(v) < 2v=3] when the bidder is risk-seeking. This completes
the proof of proposition 2.
From Myerson’s (1981) revenue equivalence principle it should immediately be clear that
the two-bid auction is revenue-equivalent to the standard one-bid …rst-price auction when
the bidders are risk-neutral. To prove Proposition 3 we have to compare the revenues for
the cases where ® 6= 1:
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The expected revenue for the seller in the one-bid auction when the buyer with the highest
valuation has a realized value of v is
(12)
1
1 + ®
¢ v
From equation (9) it follows that the expected revenue for the seller in the two-bid auction
when the buyer with the highest valuation has a realized value of v is
(13)
L(v)
H(v)
¢ L(v) ¢ v + H(v) ¡ L(v)
H(v)
¢H(v) ¢ v:
We now show that the seller prefers the two-bid mechanism over the one-bid mechanism
when ® > 1 and the inequality is reversed when ® < 1 which proves Proposition 3.
From (12) and (13) above it is clear that it is enough to show that
(14)
L(v)
H(v)
¢ L(v) ¢ v + H(v) ¡ L(v)
H(v)
¢H(v) ¢ v > 1
1 + ®
¢ v
for every v 2 [0; 1] when ® > 1 and the inequality is reversed when ® < 1:
From the de…nitions of H(®) and L(®), however, we know that
(15)
L
H
=
(1 + ®)L
1 + ®L
; and
(16) 1 ¡ L
H
=
1 ¡ L
1 + ®L
:
Substituting (15)–(16) into (14) and rearranging we get the inequality
L >
1
1 + ®+ ®2
Substituting the de…nition of L we get the inequality
(
®
1 + ®
)
®
<
®
1 + ®
which clearly holds when ® > 1 and is reversed when ® < 1: This completes the proof of
Proposition 3.
Next, we examine the expected utility of a buyer with valuation v in the two mechanisms.
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Plugging (11) into the objective (10) gives the expected utility for a bidder with valuation
v in the one-bid auction:
(17) [
®
1 + ®
]® ¢ v1+®
The corresponding equation for the two-bid auction mechanism is :
(18)
L(v)
H(v)
¢ v ¢ [v ¡ l(v)]® + H(v) ¡ L(v)
H(v)
¢ v ¢ [v ¡ h(v)]®:
Formally, we will now show that
(19)
L(v)
H(v)
¢ v ¢ [v ¡ l(v)]® + H(v) ¡ L(v)
H(v)
¢ v ¢ [v ¡ h(v)]® > [ ®
1 + ®
]® ¢ v1+®
when ® < 1 and the reverse inequality holds when ® > 1; as proposed in Proposition 4.
(Note immediately that the two sides are indeed equal when ® = 1):
From the de…nitions of H(®) and L(®) we have
(20) 1 ¡H = ®
1 + ®
¢ [1 ¡ L];
(21) [
®
1 + ®
]® =
1 ¡ (1 + ®)L
1 ¡ L :
Substituting (15)–(16) and (20)–(21) into (19) and rearranging we get the inequality
(22) (1 ¡ L)®+1 > 1 ¡ L¡ ® ¢ (1 + ®) ¢ L2:
Plugging in the de…nition of L and rearranging we get
(23) (1 + ®)® > [1 + 2®¡ [ ®
1 + ®
]® ¢ (1 + ®)] ¢ [1 + ®¡ [ ®
1 + ®
]®]®¡1:
This implies that
(24) [
1 + ®¡ [ ®1+® ]®
1 + ®
]® <
1 + ®¡ [ ®1+® ]®
1 + 2®¡ (1 + ®)[ ®1+® ]®
:
Since however
1 + ®¡ [ ®1+® ]®
1 + ®
= 1 ¡ 1
1 + ®
[
®
1 + ®
]®;
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and for ® < 1
1 ¡ 1
1 + ®
[
®
1 + ®
]® < 1 ¡ [ ®
1 + ®
]®+1;
it immediately follows that
(25) [
1 + ®¡ [ ®1+® ]®
1 + ®
]® < 1 ¡ [ ®
1 + ®
]1+®:
To prove (24) it is thus enough to show that for ® < 1;
(26) 1 ¡ [ ®
1 + ®
]1+® <
1 + ®¡ [ ®1+® ]®
1 + 2®¡ (1 + ®)[ ®1+® ]®
:
Direct algebra shows that this is equivalent to
(27)
®(1 ¡ [ ®1+® ]®)
1 + 2®¡ (1 + ®)[ ®1+® ]®
< [
®
1 + ®
]1+®:
which under some additional manipulations becomes:
(28) [1 ¡ [ ®
1 + ®
]®]2 < [
®
1 + ®
]1+®
More algebra gives
(29) (1 + ®)® ¡ ®® < ®®+12 (1 + ®)®¡12 ;
which in turn is equivalent to
(30) [
1 + ®
®
]
®¡1
2 > [
1 + ®
®
]® ¡ 1:
To prove (19) it is thus enough to show that inequality (30) holds when ® < 1: This,
however, follows directly from the fact that the LHS and the RHS of the inequality
increase in ®; are equal when ® = 1; and the derivative of the LHS (with respect to ®) is
lower than the derivative of the RHS (with respect to ®); for every ®.
A symmetric argument shows that inequality (19) is reversed when ® > 1 which completes
the proof of Proposition 4.
Finally, we need to prove Proposition 5.
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This, however, follows directly from slight modi…cations on the arguments used in the
proof of Proposition 1:
Using subscript i to denote the bidding strategy of agent i we get the following …rst order
conditions for the asymmetric case (see equations (6) and (7) above):
(32) ¡®i[vi¡li(vi)]®i¡1 ¢h¡1j (li(vi))+[vi¡li(vi)]®i ¢ 1h0j(li(vi))¡[vi¡hi(vi)]
®i ¢ 1
h0j(li(vi))
= 0
(33) ¡ ®i ¢ [h¡1j (hi(vi)) ¡ h¡1j (li(vi))] + [vi ¡ hi(vi)] ¢ 1h0j(hi(vi)) = 0
Trying
(34) lk(vk) = Lk(®k) ¢ vk and hk(vk) = Hk(®k) ¢ vk
for k = i; j in (32) and (33) and multiplying both equations by the constant Hj gives the
same …rst order conditions as obtained for the symmetric model. This (together with the
argument used to prove Proposition 2 for the symmetric model) completes the proof of
Proposition 5.32
32The bounds on vi stated in the proposition is imposed for the “usual” reasons; see, for instance, Cox
et al.(1982).
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Appendix B:
Scatterplot of the bids 
(one-bid auction, phase 1)
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Scatterplot of the bids 
(one-bid auction, phase 2)
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Scatterplot of the high-bids 
(two-bid auction, phase 1)
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Scatterplot of the high-bids 
(two-bid auction, phase 2)
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Scatterplot of the low-bids 
(two-bid auction, phase 1)
0
50
100
150
200
50 70 90 110 130 150
real bid low
RNE bid low
truthful bidding
Scatterplot of the low-bids 
(two-bid auction, phase 2)
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Figure B.1: Scatterplots of submitted bids
(the horizontal axes denote the private values, the vertical axes denote the bids)
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Figure B.2: Cumulative distribution function of the prices
(for both auction types)
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Figure B.3: Distribution of R2 statistic (SURE model)
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Appendix C:
Translated instructions33
Please, read these instructions carefully. They are identical for all participants.
During the experiment you will take part in several auctions. In every auction a …ctitious
commodity is for sale which you can resell to the experimenters. You are one of two
bidders. In every auction the private reselling value v of each bidder is independently
drawn from the interval 50 · v · 150, with every integer number between 50 and 150
being equally likely. Each bidder may place integer bids in the range from 0 to 200. There
are two di¤erent auction types.
Type 1 (one-bid auction):
You and your partner have to submit only one bid, i.e., to o¤er a (single) price at which
you are willing to buy the commodity. The bidder with the highest bid (among the two
of you) buys the commodity. He pays his own bid and receives his reselling value. The
other bidder does not pay anything and does not receive anything. If the both bids are
equal, the buyer is chosen randomly (by the ‡ip of a fair coin).
Type 2 (two-bid auction):
You and your partner have to submit two bids, a high-bid and a low-bid, i.e., to o¤er two
prices at which you are willing to buy the commodity. The bidder with the highest bid
(among the four bids) buys the commodity and receives his reselling value. The price he
has to pay is determined as follows:
- he pays his own low-bid, if his low-bid is higher that the high-bid of the other bidder;
- he pays his own high-bid, otherwise.
The other bidder does not pay anything and does not receive anything. If the both
high-bids are equal, the buyer is chosen randomly (by the ‡ip of a fair coin).
33This is a shortened and translated version of the instructions. For the original instructions (in
German), please contact Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel.
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After you have placed your bid(s) you are informed whether or not you are the buyer,
about the price, which has to be paid by the buyer, your private reselling value, your own
bid(s), the bid(s) of the other bidder, how much you have earned in this auction, your
total pro…t up to this time and your average pro…t in each auction type (per auction type).
Altogether, you will play 48 successive auctions, which consist of 4 cycles of 12 bidding
rounds. In one cycle each participant plays …rst 6 times the auction type 1 and then 6
times the auction type 2. At the beginning of each round you are informed about the
actual auction type and your actual private reselling value of the item. In each auction
the bidder groups are formed randomly.
Any decision you make is anonymous and cannot be related to you personally by your
co-bidders. If you have questions, please, raise your hand. We will then clarify your
problems privately.
Additional Instructions (phase 2):
You now will play another 16 auctions. You can choose the auction type according to
the following rules: 7 of the 8 participants will be asked to choose one of the two auction
types (one-bid vs. two-bid) before they observe their realized reselling values. The 8-th
participant will be automatically assigned to one of these auction types in order to make
the number of players in each auction type even. For instance, if 4 players have chosen
the one-bid auction and 3 players have chosen the two-bid auction than the last player
will be asked to participate in a two-bid auction so that there will be two pairs playing
each type of auction. The identity of the ”8-th” player (the one that is not asked to
choose the auction type) will be changed in each round, so that each participant will
play the balancing role of player 8 twice during the 16 rounds. After the auction type is
determined, the auction is played as in the …rst phase.
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